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F A C U L T Y  V I E W S
The bankruptcy of two of America’s prominent industrial companies, Chrysler and General Motors, will be remembered 
as a curious footnote in the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. 
Both companies left bankruptcy through the side door via a 
“Section 363” sale, not through a plan of reorganization confirmed 
by the vote of the creditors.  Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code 
was designed to allow a company in Chapter 11 to sell off 
unneeded assets such as outmoded factories, unused real estate, 
or other assets that would not contribute to the business that was 
to emerge from Chapter 11 by the adoption of a Chapter 11 plan.
Since the 1980s, debtors have used Section 363 to turn the 
Chapter 11 process on its head. In many Chapter 11 cases of public 
companies, the debtor in possession has sold the live part of the 
business through 363 and has left the dead assets for later 
liquidation. In these transactions, the debtor in possession 
typically sells to a buyer who purchases the live business out of 
the estate for cash. Despite controversy over its wisdom and 
legality, the 363 sale of the living part of a business in Chapter 11 
has now become a well-recognized and widely practiced method 
of conducting the reorganization of a failing company. 
Both academics and practicing lawyers have questioned this use 
of Section 363. The principal criticism is that this use deprives the 
creditors of the protection that is built into the process of proposing 
and approving a plan of reorganization. It is possible but difficult to 
By James J. White, ’62
Editor’s Note: “President Obama forced Chrysler into federal bankruptcy protection on Thursday so it could pursue a lifesaving alliance 
with the Italian automaker Fiat, in yet another extraordinary intervention into private industry by the federal government.” That was the 
assessment by The New York Times when the news broke in April. 
We knew some of our faculty would have strong opinions about the way the bankruptcy was handled. We weren’t disappointed. In the 
next two articles, read J.J. White’s opinion about the Obama administration’s “clever but legal manipulation of the bankruptcy system.” 
Then read John Pottow’s ruminations, see where he parts from his colleague, and learn his answer to what he calls the “big picture 
question.” On which side of the divide did this fall: a government nationalization of heavy-handed policy guiding, or a reluctant 
intervention of capital by the ultimate lender of last resort?
Chrysler’s Bankruptcy: Money 





















F A C U L T Y  V I E W S
Had the President 
simply announced 
that the federal 
government would 
give $4 billion to 
the UAW, the 
public, even the 
public in the 
UAW’s home state 
of Michigan, 
would have been 
up in arms.
gain a court’s approval of a plan over the negative vote of a class 
of creditors. In a 363 sale there is no vote, and creditors fear that 
the debtor in possession will team up with a subset of the creditor 
group and propose a sale that disadvantages the other creditors. 
Indeed the principal limitations on such “cramdowns” over 
creditors’ negative votes arose out of just such practices by 
coalitions of shareholders and subsets of creditors in 19th century 
reorganization practice. Set against these complaints is the 
argument that the speed of 363 sales saves money and by the 
claim that a properly conducted 363 sale 
will bring as much as, or more than, the 
value that would have been realized in a 
fully negotiated and confirmed plan. UCLA 
Professor Lynn LoPucki, ’67, and I have 
debated the latter point in the Michigan 
Law Review. 
But I bore you. Chrysler presents political 
issues far more interesting and relevant 
than any claim about the proper reading 
of the bankruptcy code. Even under the 
new thinking on Section 363 sales, the 
Chrysler sale was deviant. In Chrysler, the 
nominal buyer, Fiat, put up no money. 
Rather the federal government put the $2 
billion into Chrysler so that it could pay off 
the secured creditors at 28 cents on the 
dollar. By removing $7 billion of secured 
debt from Chrysler’s balance sheet, the 
administration greatly increased the value 
of the New Chrysler’s unsecured promise 
to pay $4 billion to the UAW Voluntary 
Employee Beneficiary Association, or 
VEBA. In effect, the payment of $2 billion 
to liquidate the superior secured debt 
made it possible to move $4 billion from 
New Chrysler to the UAW for its 
unsecured claim. 
The interesting issue in Chrysler is not the 
lawyers’ manipulation of the law; it is the 
politicians’ use of the bankruptcy to 
launder money.  Had the President simply announced that the 
federal government would give $4 billion to the UAW, the public, 
even the public in the UAW’s home state of Michigan, would have 
been up in arms. By laundering the money through the Chapter 11 
process, the administration disguised the payment and avoided 
the outrage. 
Where is the evidence to support my hypothesis? Some comes 
from the deviance of the process; most can be inferred from 
Steven Rattner’s description of the political negotiation in the 
administration and of the acts and thinking of the White House 
automobile task force that Mr. Rattner directed. In an article 
published in Fortune in October, Mr. Rattner (not to be confused 
with Michigan Law’s own Steven Ratner) describes some of the 
political considerations. He notes that a proposal by Austan 
Goolsbee, a member of President Obama’s Council of Economic 
Advisers, to let Chrysler die (and so to let GM prosper) was rejected 
when the participants realized that as many as 300,000 persons 
could be thrown out of work by Chrysler’s liquidation. Mr. Rattner 
has the audacity to claim that the politicians did not interfere in 
the task force’s work, only a few pages after he describes how 
White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel was able to recite from 
memory the names of the members of Congress who represented 
the districts where Chrysler had 
manufacturing plants. 
The surprising capitulation of the 
secured creditors is also suspicious. 
There is a strong argument that a 
Section 363 sale cannot be made over 
the objection of a secured creditor, 
unless the creditor is paid not merely 
the value of the collateral that secures 
its debt (here no more than a few 
billions and quite possibly less than 
that) but the face amount of its debt 
(here $6.9 billion). Because the secured 
creditors agreed to the government’s 
offer of $2 billion—or, more accurately, 
because JPMorgan Chase & Co., the 
agent for the secured creditors, was 
found to have bound all of the secured 
creditors by its agreement—no court 
ever had to consider the argument that 
Section 363 required payment of the 
face amount of the secured debt. Mr. 
Rattner proudly claims to have moved 
Jimmy Lee, the Morgan banker who 
spoke for the secured creditors, from a 
claim for “not one penny less than $6.9 
billion” to a $2 billion settlement by 
adroit negotiation. 
There is another possibility. Mr. Lee’s 
employer and several of the other 
secured creditors were TARP (Troubled 
Asset Relief Program) recipients. It is plausible that Mr. Lee 
accepted the $2 billion and chose not to argue for more in court 
because word was passed to his boss, Jamie Dimon, that the 
administration wanted it that way. 
Understand what I am not claiming; I do not claim that the lawyers 
or the judges in Chrysler did anything wrong. If they are aggrieved 
it is only because they were the puppets attached to the 
administration’s strings. By its clever but legal manipulation of the 
bankruptcy system, the administration was able to move $4 billion 
of value to its friend the UAW while being much less generous to 
Chrysler’s secured creditors who, in another setting, could have 
received a much larger payoff. 
